












TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF SMALL 





























Copyright © 2005, NUS Entrepreneurship Centre, NUS. All rights reserved.     2
 
TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF SMALL 
COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF THE LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ASIAN NIES 
 
 
This paper examines the changing pattern of technological specialization of the four 
small, newly industrializing economies (NIEs) from East Asia as they move up the 
economic development ladder.  In addition, the paper also investigates whether there 
is convergence or divergence between these NIEs and two reference groups of 
advanced economies -- eight small, advanced European countries and the G7.   We 
find that the East Asian NIEs had a higher degree of technological concentration than 
both the group of 8 advanced small European economies and the group of G7 
countries, although the differences had narrowed over time.  The East Asian NIEs’ 
technological specialization pattern has also been diverging from those of the small 
advanced European countries, while converging among themselves (as well as 
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I.   Introduction 
 
The role that technology plays in the growth of modern economies has led to 
increasing interest in the processes of technology accumulation and specialization.  
Numerous attempts had been made to measure and explain these processes in the 
advanced countries (Pavitt 1988, Cantwell and Vertova 2002).  In contrast, there has 
been few studies on the dynamics of technological specialization in developing 
countries in general and the newly industrialized economies in particular. 
 
Studies of advanced countries’ technological specialization patterns commonly use 
two indicators: (i) the standard deviation (or variance) and/or a Galtonian regression 
of the RTA (Revealed Technological Advantage), (eg Soete 1988, Pavitt 1988, 
Amendola et al 1998 and Laursen 2000
1) and (ii) the Chi-square Index (Archibugi 
and Pianta 1992, Pianta & Meliciani 1996).  Archibugi and Pianta (1994, 1998) also 
used the Distance Index to measure technological distance and specialization.   
 
These studies have produced valuable information about the specialization patterns 
of nations.  For example, one pattern that has emerged using the three measures is 
the higher levels of technological specialization of small countries as opposed to 
large countries.  Some studies have also found that among these countries, those 
that are less developed have higher levels of specialization than those that are more 
advanced (see for example Pianta and Meliciani 1996; Laursen 2000).   
 
The evidence regarding changes in specialization over time is less conclusive.  A 
general upwards trend has been found, but there are great variations among 
countries and between studies and measures used (eg Archibugi and Pianta 1992, 
Pianta and Meliciani 1996, Amendola et al 1998, Laursen 2000).   
 
Fewer studies have been conducted on technological specialization in developing 
countries.  Using the Chi-square index, Mahmood and Singh (2004) found that 
among the four Asian NIEs (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), two countries 
increased their specialization over time and two decreased.  No comparison of 
specialization levels was made with more advanced countries. 
 
As pointed out by Dalum et al (1998), some refinement is needed to our 
understanding and measurement of technological specialization, in particular in 
distinguishing between the processes of convergence from that of concentration (see 
for example Dalum et al 1998).  The RTA, Chi-square Index, and Distance Index are 
all calculated relative to some norm (usually, the world average).  Thus they do not 
measure the level of concentration of technological activity by technology classes per 
se, but rather of the deviation from the world average – that is the degree of 
convergence to or divergence from the world norm.  A separate measure of the 
degree of concentration (or diversification) by technological classes is thus needed to 
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compare and track changes in the technological specialization patterns among 
countries.    
 
This paper seeks to fill the above two gaps in the literature by benchmarking the two 
separate measures of technological specialization – concentration and divergence -- 
of the four East Asian NIEs over more than two decades (1978-2001) against a 
basket of eight small advanced European countries as well as against the group of 
G7 countries.  As our data extend to 2001, our results also provide a more current 
analysis than is available in many studies that stopped around the early 1990s.  We 
also tested the robustness of our findings by using more than one measure for both 
the concentration and divergence concept.   
 
We have chosen to focus on the four more advanced East Asian NIEs (Taiwan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore), rather than a broader basket of East Asian 
economies, based on the fact that there is still a substantial divide in terms of 
technological capabilities between these four economies and the others, e.g. 
Malaysia, China and Thailand.  As can be seen from Table 3,  the other NIEs are still 
no where near the four in terms of patenting intensity by 2000.     
 
We show that the East Asian NIEs are indeed more concentrated in their 
technological activity as compared to the advanced countries over the period 1978 to 
1999.  Although initially having high deviations from the world norm, they have 
converged strongly to the sectoral patterns exhibited by the world average, and by 
the large countries in particular.  The small European and large advanced countries, 
on the other hand, are diverging away from the world average and from each other, 
both at the group level (ie inter-group differences are rising) and within the groups 
(intra-group differences are also rising).   
 
Our findings contribute to the literature on international innovation pattern by 
showing not only systematic differences in technology specialization pattern between 
small and large advanced economies over a 24 year period, but also that distinctive 
patterns exist between the two groups of small economies -- the late-industrializing 
NIEs and the advanced small European economies.  In particular, we show the 
usefulness of distinguishing between two conceptually different measures of 
technological specialization
2 - concentration and divergence – in analyzing 
technological specialization patterns of countries. 
 
2. Theory development 
 
The literature has identified two different conceptual measures of specialization: the 
degree of concentration (or its converse, diversification), and divergence or 
dissimilarities (or its converse, convergence or similarities) from some defined norm. 
In a study of trade patterns, Dalum et al (1998, p. 424) differentiate between the two 
as follows: 
                                                 
2 See also Laursen 2000   5
 
 “A specialization process refers to a process in which specialization intra-
country becomes more dispersed (and counter-wise for de-specialisation).  
On the contrary, a divergence process refers to a process in which countries 
become more different in terms of specialization in a particular sector, across 
countries (and counter-wise for convergence). 
 
2.1 Technological Concentration 
 
There are two opposing factors in deciding on the portfolio of investment in 
technology.  On the one hand, to the extent that R&D investments are risky, options 
theory suggests that countries should diversify their investments so as to hedge their 
bets.  On the other hand, the theory of economies of scale suggests that a country 
may want to concentrate her resources into a smaller number of technological areas 
with the hope of achieving scale economies advantage.  Scale economies may also 
imply a minimum absolute threshold scale, below which it is not worthwhile to 
engage in certain forms of R&D activities.  In addition, the theory of comparative 
advantage suggests that different countries are likely to start off with different 
endowments in the resource inputs to R&D, and hence would be better off if they 
concentrate more resources on areas where they are better endowed to begin with.  
Although this argument appears more important in driving divergence among 
countries (see discussion in Section 2.2 below), it will also lead to more uneven 
distribution of resources within a given country than would otherwise be.  
 
The economies of scale argument suggests that large countries, having a larger 
domestic market and greater absolute quantity of endowed resources, can afford to 
distribute or diversify their technological investments across many technological 
areas and still be able to meet or exceed the minimum threshold scale or critical 
mass for achieving excellence in each of these technological areas.  In contrast, 
small countries may face greater constraints and hence must decide whether to 
spread the available resources more thinly over a wide variety of areas, or to focus 
on a few specific fields.  While the former approach may have its merits from the 
perspective of options theory, the country may run the risk of spreading itself too 
thinly, and it’s contribution is unlikely to be world-class in any one field.  Moreover, 
everything else equal, larger countries are more likely to have more diversified 
resources, whereas small countries may have more specialized resource 
endowments.  Taken together, the above arguments suggest that small countries are 
therefore more likely to concentrate their innovation efforts on a smaller number of 
technological fields.   
 
Among the small countries, the late-industrializing countries are expected to face 
more severe resource constraints, especially in the early years of their development,  
than do the small countries which are already advanced to begin.  Table 1 shows 
that the average GDP per capita for the Asian NIEs was less than half of the small 
advanced countries in 1980, though by 2000 they had caught up substantially, with 
Hong and Singapore achieving income level that even exceeded some of the   6
advanced small advanced European and G7 countries.  A picture of even more rapid 
catching up is found when one compares the patenting intensities of the NIEs with 
the small advanced European countries, as the NIEs started with an even bigger gap 
compared to the Europeans (see Table 1).  Both Korea and Taiwan increased their 
income level by about 3 times over the 20 year period, but raised their patenting 
intensity by 146 times and 55 times respectively.    
 
Besides sharing the same small size constraints as the group of small European 
countries that are already relatively advanced to begin with, the NIEs needed to grow 
fast, and thus were likely to pursue a higher degree of specialization to capitalize on 
the sectors where they had the highest comparative advantage.  We would thus 
expect the Asian NIEs to have high levels of technological concentration – higher 
even than the small advanced European countries, which still have a larger pool of 
cumulated technological resources than do the NIEs.  We thus have the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Small advanced economies are more concentrated in their 
technological activities than the large advanced countries. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The small East Asian NIEs are more concentrated in their 
technological activities than the small advanced countries. 
 
Increasing globalization is expected to have a significant impact on how the pattern 
of concentration of countries’ technological activities change over time.  Firstly, 
globalization implies increasing competitive pressure from abroad, and the need for 
domestic firms to become not just competitive domestically, but also on a global 
scale.  This is expected to drive increasing concentration of resources into areas 
where domestic firms are more globally competitive.  Secondly, globalization 
increases international resource mobility, allowing countries which are already 
competitive in particular technological fields to attract even more resources from 
abroad to augment their domestic resource supply.  Thus we would expect to see a 
global trend of increasing concentration of technological activities at a national level, 
regardless of the size of the economy or stage of development.   
 
Mahmood (1999) argues for a U-shaped pattern of specialization change over time 
for NIEs.  During the early phases of its industrial development, a country would have 
a higher level of specialization, as its economy would mainly comprise labour-
intensive and natural resource-intensive activities.  As this country’s resources 
increase and it broadens its industrial activities into scale-intensive industries, its 
degree of specialization would be expected to decline.  This de-specialization would 
continue until it moves into knowledge-intensive activities, at which point the need for 
economies of scale in R&D would lead to increasing specialization, this time in high-
technology sectors (Mahmood 1999, Mahmood and Singh 2003).  Thus the pattern 
that emerges is a U-shaped curve, with high but falling degrees of specialization in 
early periods and then rising levels in later periods.   
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Mahmood and Singh (2003) did not themselves find unambiguous evidence of this 
U-shaped curve.  Therefore, we will confine ourselves to a more general hypothesis 
regarding increasing technology concentration over time over time, regardless of the 
stages of development:  
 
Hypothesis 1c: The level of concentration of technological specialization for all 
country groups rise over time.   
 
2.2 Technological Convergence 
 
While the above arguments suggest that both small advanced countries and the 
small catching-up NIEs to have high concentration in their technological activities 
relative to large countries, they say nothing about whether these small countries are 
concentrating on similar or dissimilar technology areas as one another and as 
pursued by the large advanced countries.  Conceptually, it is entirely possible that 
two countries can both have highly concentrated technology portfolios, and yet be 
little different from one another, because they may happen to concentrate in very 
similar technology areas.  High concentration thus does not necessarily lead to high 
divergence.   
 
The theory of comparative advantage has been used to account for why countries 
specialize in different things.  For example, Walsh(1998) argued that small advanced 
countries often develop their competence and experience in niche markets that the 
large countries are not interested in, or are unable to compete in due to resource-
specific comparative disadvantages.  Small countries are therefore likely to specialize 
in areas that are different from the large countries and from each other, as this would  
give them some degree of product differentiation in the global market.  Indeed, this 
has been found to be so in many prior studies showing small countries to have a 
higher level of divergence from the world norm than the large countries (eg Soete 
1988, Archibugi and Pianta 1992, Archibugi and Pianta 1994, Laursen 2000).   
 
The East Asian NIEs, at least in the earlier years of their development, would be 
expected to be even more different from the large advanced countries because 
during the early phases of their industrial development, their economies would mainly 
comprise labour-intensive and natural resource-intensive activities, with perhaps 
some scale-intensive activities, whereas the advanced countries are more 
specialized in knowledge-intensive activities (Mahmood 1999).   
 
More generally, a number of prior research had identified a consistent inverse 
relationship between the size of the technology base and the degree of specialization 
in terms of divergence from the world norm (Archibugi and Pianta 1992 p. 107, 
Archibugi and Pianta 1994, Soete 1988
3).  Pianta & Meliciani (1996) also found that 
the group with the highest rates of deviation from the world average were those 
                                                 
3 These studies used indicators which measured deviation from the world norm, such as the 
standard deviation of the RTA and the Chi-square Index, as a measure of specialization   8
classified as “small, laggard countries”, which have the lowest levels of technological 
activities.  Laursen (2000) similarly found less advanced countries to be more 
technologically divergent from the world norm.  We therefore postulate the following:: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The small advanced European economies have larger deviations 
from the world average than the large countries 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The NIEs have larger deviations from the world average than the 
small advanced European countries 
 
Just as globalization is expected to increase the propensity of countries to have more 
concentrated technology portfolios, we can expect globalization to increase the 
tendency for countries that are already relatively advanced to become technologically 
more differentiated over time.  Being already relatively close to the technological 
frontiers in various technological areas, the gains from imitating or competing directly 
against the technological leaders are probably less than if the country is able to 
differentiate from others by specializing further in areas that she already has the most 
comparative advantage, and for which she can become a world technological leader.   
While this argument applies to both small and large advanced countries, smaller 
countries are expected to deviate more from the world norm, since the larger 
countries are weighted more heavily in the world norm.   
 
In contrast to the small advanced countries, we predict that the late-industrializing 
economies would exhibit a different technological divergence trend over time.  In 
particular, we note that the East Asian NIEs, in spite of their rapid technological 
catching up, are still somewhat behind the technological frontiers on most technology 
areas.  Indeed, although Table 1 shows that the NIEs had by and large caught up 
with the advanced countries in terms of current  patenting propensity by 2000, in 
terms of cumulative stock of patent per capita, they are still significantly behind the 
advanced countries on almost all technological areas, given that they started out on 
such a low base.  As such, these late-industrializing economies do not have the 
option (yet) to become technological leaders themselves through differentiation.   
Instead, their best course of action is likely to remain one of following the leaders, i.e. 
specialize in the same areas of the technological leaders, with the aim to either 
exploit the “learning spillovers” from them, or to tap the market demand already 
created by these leaders through incremental or complementary innovations around 
the same technology areas of the leaders.  Both arguments would suggest that these 
late-industrializing countries should converge closer to the largest technology 
industries in which the largest countries operate to maximize the leverage on the 
large technology pools (spillover learning) and large markets (gains from incremental 
innovation) (Laursen 2000).  We thus have: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Deviations or divergence from the world average in terms of 
specialization by technology areas fall over time for the NIEs, but rise for both the 
small and large advanced economies 
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If both these arguments hold true – that small advanced countries diverge their 
technological activities away from those of the advanced countries over time, while 
the catching-up countries continue to converge towards those of the advanced 
countries, we would expect the small advanced countries and the catching-up 
countries to have divergent technological patterns from one another.  Furthermore, 
we can expect the convergent and/or divergent trend to occur not only inter-group, 
but also intra-group as well.  Hence our next hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The dissimilarity between the NIEs and small advanced countries in 
terms of areas of specialization rise over time, but fall between the NIEs and the 
large advanced countries.  In contrast, the dissimilarity between small advanced 
countries and the large countries rise over time.   
 
Hypothesis 3c: The intra-group differences among the NIEs fall over time.   
However, the intra-group differences among the small advanced European countries, 
and among the large countries rise over time. 
 
2.3 Magnitude of Structural change 
 
A change in either measures of technological specialization represent a change in 
the underlying structural composition of innovation activities (distribution by 
technology classes) from one period to another.  While the above hypothesized 
directions of change in the technological specialization pattern of the different groups 
of countries over time make predictions on the sign  of the changes (increasing 
concentration or diversification, and/or increasing convergence or divergence), they 
say nothing about the magnitude of the structure changes involved.   Conceptually, 
an increasing concentration of technological portfolio over time can be accompanied 
by either little structural change or large structural change.  This is because the 
increasing concentration pattern can come about through either incremental changes 
in the distribution across the technology classes, or through drastic transformation.  
For example, a technology class A that previously represents 10% of all technology 
classes in one period may increase to 11% in the next period, with all other classes 
reducing their share correspondingly; this would result in very minor structural 
change.  However, it is conceivable that technology class A may have its share of all 
technology classes reduced from 10% to zero % in the next period, while another 
technology class, say B, that previously has zero % now having 10% share.   
Although there is no change in the concentration index over the two period, a 
significant structural change has occurred.    
 
While the prior literature tends to emphasize path-dependency and continuity in the 
innovation structure of countries over time (see e.g. Nelson (ed.) 1993, and Pianta & 
Meliciani 1996), it does not  directly address the question of whether small countries 
are likely to experience smaller or larger structural change than large countries, 
neither does it highlight differences between advanced and newly industrializing 
economies.  There is however a considerable body of literature highlighting the rapid 
pace of change in the industrial structure of the NIEs in their industrial catch-up   10
process (see e.g. Wong and Ng (eds) 2001).  Extrapolating from this empirical 
evidence on the speed and magnitude of the NIE’s industrial structural transformation 
in the last 25 years, which clearly exceeded what has been experienced by the 
advanced countries, we therefore predict that the late-industrializing NIEs would 
experience the largest amount of inter-period structural changes in technological 
specialization over the years.  In contrast, we expect the large advanced countries to 
have experienced the smallest amount of inter-period structural change, with the 
small advanced countries to have intermediate experiences.   Thus, our final 
hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The Asian NIEs experience higher levels of inter-period technological 
structural change than the small advanced countries, which in turn have higher levels 
of inter-period structural change than the large countries. 
 
3.   Method 
 
We compare the concentration and convergence of technological activity among the 
four Asian NIEs with eight small advanced European countries, which we shall call 
the S8 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland), and with the large advanced countries of the OECD (i.e. the G7 
comprising US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada).   
 
The eight small advanced countries were chosen on the basis of per capita national 
income.  Table 2 shows that among the small countries in Europe, these eight, 
together with Ireland, had the highest GNP per capita in 1999.  Moreover, a clear gap 
is seen between the last of these eight economies (Sweden) and the next highest 
among the other European countries (Spain) in terms of per capita income level.  We 
excluded Ireland as its per capita income level was lower than the other eight at the 
beginning of our study period (1978), and moreover, Ireland’s patenting intensity was 
much lower than the other eight at the beginning of our study period.  Anyway, we 
have conducted sensitivity analysis and found that the inclusion of Ireland results in 
no change to our findings.   
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 
Following the tradition of technological specialization studies, we used US patent 
data.  Although not perfect, patent data are the best available indicators for such an 
analysis, given the detailed data made available for many countries over a long time 
period.  The US patent database allows a high degree of international comparability, 
and given the US’ position as the world’s largest technology market, it is reasonable 
to assume that any technology aimed at the international market will be registered 
there (Archibugi and Pianta 1994).    
 
One problem with using US patent data is the higher propensity to register a patent in 
one’s own country rather than overseas; as such, results for the US are not wholly 
comparable with those of other countries.  However, when comparing degrees   11
(rather than fields) of specialization, this problem is somewhat muted.  Another 
limitation is that patenting at home tends to be broader-based (i.e. less specialized) 
than overseas, so that other things being equal, concentration levels in the US will be 
understated (Pianta and Meliciani 1996). 
 
It is common practice in technological specialization studies to use the first country 
listed in the patent (Mahmood and Singh 2003).  However, in order to more fully 
capture the scope of countries’ technological activities, we have taken into account 
the countries of all inventors referred to in each patent.  This is similar to Laursen’s 
(2000) approach, although in our study we counted a full patent for every country that 
contributed to each individual patent, rather than 1/m patents to each m countries 
referred to in the patent.  Similarly, one patent was attributed to each sector referred 
to in the patent.  Our data was categorized according to the 21 subsections of the 
sixth edition of the IPC (see Annex Table A1).  Previous studies have generally used 
a finer level of aggregation, basing their analysis on their analysis on 30 or 40 
classifications (eg Archibugi and Pianta 1992, Pianta and Meliciani 1996, Amendola 
et al 1998, Mahmood and Singh 2003).  While classification of patent data according 
to the US patent classification system has also commonly been used, we utilized the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) system to be more compatible with several 
prior studies 
 
As with other studies, the patent data has been aggregated across several years in 
order to reduce year-to-year fluctuations.  In particular, we divided the 24 year 
timeframe (1978-2001) into four equal six-year time periods for each measure: 1978-
1983, 1984-1989,1990-1995 and 1996-01.   
 
3.2 Indicators  
 
Since concentration and convergence represent two conceptually different ways to 
interpret technological specialization, we need to measure them using different 
constructs.  To increase robustness, we use multiple measures, or indicators, for 
each of these two specialization constructs.  In addition, we introduce an indicator to 
measure the structural difference between two distributions of patents by patent 
classes.  All the indicators used are well established measures from the prior 
literature on measuring specialization, although some of them have been less used in 
the context of technological specialization.   
 




The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality in a distribution, ranging from 
0 (no inequality) to 1 (complete inequality).  Although usually used to measure 
income inequality, it has also been used to measure technological specialization.   
Mancusi (2001) used the Gini coefficient to measure geographical concentration of 







































Although typically used as a measure of market concentration, the Herfindahl Index 
has also been used to measure countries’ specialization in manufacturing (eg 
Weinhold and Rauch 1997).  Here we have modified it to measure technological 










The specialization index is similar to the Herfindahl index.  Also independent of the 
world total, it has been used by UNIDO to measure the degree of 
specialization of countries’ manufacturing activities (UNIDO 1997).  For our 






si = the share of the ith branch in total patents in the year and hmax is the natural 
logarithm of the number of patent classes. 
 
The index ranges from 0 (when all patent classes have the same share) to 100 (all 
patents are in one class) 
 
Indicators for Technological Convergence 
 
Standard Deviation of Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) 
 






Where nij is the number of patents of country i in technological class j registered with 
the USPTO.  Values above one show a relative specialization in that patent class, 
and vice versa for values below one.    
 




















The chi-squared statistic is calculated by comparing the “percentage distribution 
across sectors of the science or technology activities for a given country and the 
percentage distribution of the world total” (Archibugi & Pianta (1992 p. 104).  Like the 
RTA, it shows the extent to which countries concentrate their patents across sectors 
relative to the world average (Pianta and Meliciani 1996). 
 
The formula for the chi-squared statistic is: 
 
where: i is the country under consideration 
   j is the sectors of the distribution 
     pij is the percentage of the variable considered held by country i in class j 
  pwj is the percentage of the variable considered for the world total in class j 
 
If the country’s distribution of patents is the same as the world total, the index takes a 
value of 0, and grows rapidly as the two distributions diverge.  
 
The chi-squared index has several limitations.  One is its sensitivity to extreme 
values.  Another is that since it is based on countries’ deviations from the world 
average, the larger a country’s US patenting, the larger its contribution to the world 
average and hence the lower its value (Pianta and Meliciani 1996).   
 




The distance index is an application of the chi-squared index, measuring the distance 
between pairs of countries in terms of their US patenting activities in different sectors 
(Archibugi & Pianta 1994).  The formula for the distance index is: 
 
where:  Dab is the distance index between country a and country b 

































 pib is the percentage of patents in country b in sector i 
piw is the percentage of patents of the world total in sector i 
n is equal to the number of patent classes 
Dmax is the maximum value of the distance for a given world distribution in n 
classes 
 
Values for the indicator range from 0, for two countries with exactly the same 
percentage distribution of patents across all the patent classes, to 1000.   
 
One advantage of the distance index is that it compares patents within each patent 
class, which allows for the fact that the propensity to patent varies across sectors.   
 
 




A summary of results is provided in Table 4.  All the indicators for concentration (the 
Gini Coefficient, the Herfindahl Index and the Specialization Index) show the NIEs as 
having the highest specialization levels in all four time periods (Figures 1-3).     
Hypothesis 1b is thus supported. 
 
However, all three indicators show the group of small advanced European countries 
(S8) as having very similar levels of concentration to the large countries – in fact, the 
G7 are marginally less concentrated than the S8.  Hypothesis 1a is thus not 
supported. 
 
The Gini Coefficient, Herfindahl Index and Speciaization Index all show increasing 





In the earlier periods (1978-83 and 1984-89), the NIEs had the highest levels of Chi-
square Index and standard deviations of the RTA, followed by the S8 and then the 
G7.  However in later periods (1990-95 for the standard deviation of the RTA and 
1996-01 for the Chi-square Index), the NIEs converged so strongly that they had 
lower deviations from the world norm than did the S8.  Thus Hypothesis 2b is only 
supported in the earlier periods.  Hypothesis 2a is supported as S8 stays above G7 




In support of Hypothesis 3a, the Chi-square Index and standard deviation of the RTA 
show the NIEs to be reducing their deviations from the world average, while the S8   15
and G7 increasingly diverged from the world norm over time.  The latter result is 
stronger for the S8 than the G7 (Figures 4-5).     
 
 
The Distance Index provides a measure of the magnitude of the structural change 
taking place in the countries’ patenting activities over different time periods.  Over 
time the NIEs’ technology specialization patterns grew more similar to the large 
countries, although there was some reversal of this in the last period (Figure 6a).  
However, they have increasingly specialized in areas distinct from the S8, as 
reflected in the increasing value of the S8-NIE distance index from 1978-83 to 1995-
99.  The technological distance between the S8 and the G7 also rises over time.  
Hypothesis 3b is generally supported. 
 
Hypothesis 3c is also supported, with the intra-group differences among the NIEs 
falling steadily from 1987-83 to 1996-01, while the intra-group differences for the S8 




Hypothesis 4 is also supported.  As can be seen from Figure 6c, as measured by the 
Distance Index, the average inter-period (1
st to 4
th period) difference for the NIEs is 
substantially larger than that for the S8, which in turn is higher than that for the G7.   
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our results provide the first empirical evidence on the pattern of technological 
specialization of the East Asian NIEs, how they have changed over time, and 
whether they have converged or diverged from the small advanced European 
countries as well as the G7 group of large advanced countries. The findings seem to 
largely support the hypothesized patterns and trends.  In particular, they show that 
the NIEs, in the process of catching up, had increased the degree of concentration of 
their patenting in terms of technology classes, which were consistently higher than 
those of the S8 and the G7 countries.   This finding is robust to the choice of 
measures of concentration used (Gini Coefficient, Herfindahl Index and 
Specialization Index). 
 
Our results also show that the NIEs were converging towards the pattern of 
specialization by technology classes of the large advanced countries (G7) over time, 
while diverging from the pattern of the S8.  Thus, the “catching-up” of the NIEs was 
primarily with reference to the G7.  In contrast, their technology specialization pattern 
was becoming more dissimilar from the S8, partly because the S8 themselves were 
becoming increasingly dissimilar from the G7.   This inter-group finding is mirrored by 
the intra-group finding that the NIEs were becoming more similar to one another in 
their technological specialization while the S8 countries (as well as the G7) were 
becoming less similar.     
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The results thus strongly suggest quite different competitive dynamics going on 
between the NIEs and the S8.  On the one hand, in trying to “catch up”, the NIEs 
appear to be targeting the large advanced countries as their reference models, but 
with greater degree of concentration to enhance their competitiveness in view of their 
small size.  Intra-country differences among the NIEs are reduced over time, since 
they appear to target similar high technology areas, particularly electronics and IT, 
that the G7 were strong in.  The S8 economies, in contrast, were already relatively 
advanced since the late 1970s, and thus were seeking to differentiate themselves, 
both from the large countries as well as from one another, in order to stay 
competitive.   The large countries in the G7 group are similarly diverging from one 
another’s technology specialization pattern, but at a lower pace from that of the S8, 
possibly because of the greater degree of inertia that large countries may face. 
 
Our results also appear to confirm the usefulness of the conceptual distinction 
between specialization in the sense of concentration of technological activities by 
technology classes as opposed to divergence or dissimilarities of technological 
activities from some reference norm.  That these are two distinct phenomena 
captured by different indicators is reflected in the correlation coefficients of the 
indicators (see Table 5).  The Gini Coefficient, Specialization Index, and Herfindahl 
Index, which measure the concentration are strongly related, having Pearson 
correlation coefficients of about 0.9.  Similarly, the standard deviation of RTA and the 
Chi-square Index, which both measure convergence, are also highly correlated 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.76).  However, the Chi-square measure has 
much weaker correlation with the three measures of concentration, while the 
correlation of RTA with the three concentration measures were statistically 
insignificant.    
 
The differences in the relationship between concentration and convergence vs. the 
size of economy can also be seen from Annex C, which shows the results of 
regressing the various concentration and convergence indices on economy size for 
the 19 economies covered in our study.    As can be seen, whether measured in 
terms of GDP or cumulative number of patents, the convergence measures exhibit 
significant negative correlation with economic size, whereas the concentration 
measures show weak to no correlation.  
 
One important outcome of measuring technological specialization in terms of these 
two dimensions is our finding that the small advanced European countries appear to 
have lower concentration of technological activities than the large countries, even 
though they are found to have higher divergence or dissimilarities from the world 
norm.  While much of the existing literature has emphasized the latter finding (see 
e.g. Archibugi & Pianta 1992, Pianta & Meliciani 1996) as evidence of higher 
technological specialization of small countries, the former dimension has not been 
earlier explored, and our finding appears to be unexpected.  Further research is 
needed to explain why the small advanced European countries are actually more 
diversified by technology classes than the large countries, even as they become 
more dissimilar from the large advanced countries.   One possible explanation is that   17
these economies are trying to do two things simultaneously: concentrating more of 
their R&D investments in selected niche natural resource-based technology areas 
where they had historically built up competitive strengths (e.g. wood-based 
technologies (Sweden, Norway and Finland), and shipping (Norway, Denmark and 
the Netherlands)), while at the same time diversifying into non-natural resource-
based technological areas like electronics and telecommunications.  
 
To test the robustness of our findings, we have also tried a number of variations in 
terms of the choice of countries to be included in the reference set of small, 
advanced countries.  We added Ireland, Australia and New Zealand into the set and 
obtained similar results.  We also tried removing Hong Kong from the group of NIEs, 
on the ground that Hong Kong has pursued a less technology development-focused 
economic development strategy than the other three NIEs (Wong and Ng (eds.) 
2001).  As can be seen from Annex B, the results remain largely similar, except that 
the divergence measures show an increase from the first to second period, before 
continuing their decrease in the third and fourth period, rather than a continuous 
decrease throughout the four periods.  This suggests that the three NIEs’ went 
through a much more concentrated shift towards IT than was pursued by the 
advanced G7 countries during the period of 1984-89.  Lastly, we tested the 
sensitivity of our findings to the use of a more disaggregated classification of 
technology areas for a subset of the indicators; while the absolute values are 
different, the qualitative findings remain unchanged.  
 
In conclusion, our findings contribute to the literature on national innovation systems 
by highlighting the different competitive dynamics that drive technological 
specialization of small versus large countries in general, and among small, late-
industrializing economies versus small, advanced economies in particular.  Our 
findings also call for the need to distinguish the two dimensions of technological 
specialization – concentration vs. convergence -- to achieve greater insights on the 
dynamics of international technological competition.    
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Table 1   GDP per capita and patents per capita for S8, Asian NIEs and G7, 1980 and 2000 
    Real GDP per capita  Patents per capita  Population 
   ($constant,  1996)  Growth rate (%)  (patents per million)  Growth rate (%) (millions)
   1980  2000  1980-2000  1981 2000  1981-2000 2000 
  Austria 15,706.0  23,681.3  2.1  37.5  66.2  3.0 8.1 
  Belgium 16,302.8  23,784.3 1.9  28.5  73.7 5.1  10.3 
  Denmark 18,281.7  26,627.2  1.9  26.9  95.4  6.9  5.3 
S8  Finland 15,484.2  23,798.5  2.2  32.3  125.4  7.4  5.2 
  Netherlands 16,163.6  24,313.2  2.1  46.8  88.6  3.4  15.9 
  Norway 16,771.6  27,044.0  2.4  23.9  59.2 4.9  4.5 
  Sweden 17,179.4  23,661.8 1.6  103.7  195.9 3.4  8.9 
  Switzerland 22,319.7  26,421.6  0.9  199.3  202.9  0.1  7.2 
  Hong Kong  12,516.1  26,703.4  3.9  13.1  80.6  10.0  6.8 
NIE  Korea 4,829.5  15,881.3  6.1 0.5  73.4  30.0  47.3 
  Singapore 11,460.3 24938.8
a 4.0  1.6  60.2 21.0  4.0 
  Taiwan 5,849.9  17056.1
b 5.5  4.8  266.6
 c 23.5  21.8 
  Canada 19,022.3  26,922.2  1.8  51.5  127.6 4.9  30.8 
  France 16,201.1  22,371.4  1.6  41.1  69.1  2.8 60.4 
  Germany 15,840.7  22,861.1  1.9  82.3  131.7  2.5  82.2 
G7  Italy 15,161.4  21,794.2  1.8  16.5  34.1  3.9  57.7 
  Japan 15,631.2  24,671.7  2.3 74.4  259.4  6.8  126.9 
  UK 14,340.1  22,188.2  2.2  46.2  68.4  2.1  59.8 
  US 21,336.6  33,308.4  2.3  188.0  352.2  3.4  275.4 
a Figure for 1996 
b Figure for 1998 
c Calculated using 1998’s population figures 
Note: Components of Real GDP per capita are obtained by extrapolating the 1996 values in international dollars from the Geary aggregation using national 
growth rates.  It is a fixed base index where the reference year is 1996. 
Source: Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2002).  Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania 
(CICUP), October 2002.  Downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
  United States Patent and Tradement Office. (2002).  Patent counts by country/state and year: All patents, all types, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 
2001.  A Technology Assessment and Forecast Report, February 2002, downloaded from 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm 
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Table 2   Real GDP per capita 2000 for small European countries 

















Slovak Republic  4,434.91
Source: Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2002).  Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center 
for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 
2002.  Downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
 
 
Table 3  Patents per capita (no. of patents per million) 1981-2000 
 1981  1990  2000 
Hong  Kong  13.09 26.47 80.62 
Korea 0.46 6.76  73.44 
Singapore 1.58  5.25  60.23 
Taiwan 4.84  42.56  266.61
 a 
Chile  0.18 0.15 1.05 
China 0.00 0.04 0.13 
India  0.01 0.03 0.13 
Mexico  0.67 0.42 1.03 
Malaysia  0.07 0.33 2.02 
Thailand  0.04 0.05 0.49 
a Calculated using 1998’s population figures 
 
Source: Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2002).  Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center 
for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 
2002.  Downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
  United States Patent and Tradement Office. (2002).  Patent counts by country/state 
and year: All patents, all types, January 1, 1977 - December 31, 2001.  A Technology 
Assessment and Forecast Report, , February 2002, downloaded from 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm 
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Table 4   Summary of results 
Hypothesis no.  Statement of hypothesis  Result 
Hypotheses regarding concentration 
1a  Small advanced countries are more concentrated 
than the large advanced countries 
Not supported 
1b  NIEs are more concentrated than small advanced 
countries 
Supported 
1c  Concentration for all country groups rises over time  Supported 
Hypothesis regarding convergence 
2a  Small advanced countries have larger deviations 
from world average than large countries 
Supported 
2b  NIEs have larger deviations from world average 
than the small advanced countries 
Supported for 
earlier periods
Hypotheses regarding changes in convergence over time 
3a  Deviation from the world average falls over time for 
NIEs 
 Deviation from the world average rises over time 
for small and large advanced countries 
Supported 
3b  Dissimilarity between NIEs and small advanced 
countries rises over time 
Dissimilarity between small advanced countries 
and large countries rises over time 








3c  Intra-group differences among the NIEs fall over 
time 
Intra-group differences among small advanced 
countries and large countries rises over time 
Supported 
Hypotheses regarding magnitude of structural change 
4  NIEs have higher levels of structural change over 
time than the small advanced countries 
Small advanced countries have higher levels of 
















Chi-Square Index  1.000 .739**  .241*  .267*  .199 
Standard Deviation of RTA  1.000 .036  .042  -.021 
Gini Coefficient      1.000 .972**  .903** 
Specialization Index       1.000 .969** 
Herfindahl Index        1.000 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    






Average S8 13.12 13.18 15.83 19.56
Average NIE 21.58 19.21 26.85 31.37
Average G7 13.53 14.78 16.95 20.11






Average S8 0.475 0.48 0.522 0.573
Average NIE 0.574 0.567 0.641 0.681
Average G7 0.49 0.512 0.543 0.585
1978-83 1984-89 1990-95 1996-2001
















Figure 2   Herfindahl Index 
 
 









Average S8 0.090 0.090 0.100 0.122
Average NIE 0.125 0.109 0.173 0.205
Average G7 0.093 0.096 0.106 0.120





Average S8 28.96 48.89 61.86 66.68
Average NIE 244.35 143.36 68.5 54.5
Average G7 7.22 9.53 12.14 13.26
1978-83 1984-89 1990-1995 1996-2001
Figure 4   Standard Deviation of RTA 
 
Figure 5   Chi-square Index 
 
 







Average S8 0.646 1.407 1.901 1.789
Average NIE 2.288 1.705 0.893 0.738
Average G7 0.313 0.402 0.443 0.461









S8-NIE 374.4 377.6 463.5 575.4
S8-G7 50.8 112.4 211.1 275.8
NIE-G7 361.3 313.0 275.9 317.7








 Average NIE Average S8 Average G7
 









































Among S8 73.9 172.5 336.5 434.4
Among NIEs 633.4 522.9 260.5 256.4
Among G7 22.1 41.8 76.8 99.4
1978-83 1984-89 1990-95 1996-2001  24
Annex A    
Table A1  Classifications used for patent data 
  IPC version 6 subsections 
A0 Agriculture 
A2 Foodstuffs;  tobacco 
A4  Personal or domestic articles 
A6 Health;  amusement 






D0  Textile or flexible materials not otherwise provided for 
D2 Paper 
E0 Building 
E2  Earth or rock drilling; mining 
F0 Engines  or  pumps 
F1  Engineering in general 
F2 Lighting;  heating 
F4 Weapons;  blasting 
G0+G1 Instruments 
G2 Nucleonics 
H0  Electricity (section H) 




Table B1  Indicators for NIEs including and excluding Hong Kong 
 
 Time  Period 
 1978-83  1984-89  1990-95  1996-2001 
Gini Coefficient (incl HK)  0.574  0.567  0.641  0.681 
Gini Coefficient (excl HK)  0.537  0.548  0.648  0.711 
Herfindahl Index (inc HK)  0.125  0.109  0.173  0.205 
Herfindahl Index (excl HK)  0.107  0.102  0.188  0.234 
Specialization Index (incl HK)  21.58  19.21  26.85  31.37 
Specialization Index (excl HK)  18.87  18.00  28.28  35.00 
Standard Deviation of RTA (incl HK)  2.288  1.705  0.893  0.738 
Standard Deviation of RTA (excl HK)  1.851  1.898  0.801  0.606 
Chi-square Index (incl HK)  244.35  143.36  68.50  54.50 
Chi-square Index (excl HK)  124.52  166.35  64.83  49.97 
Inter-group Distance Index: S8-NIE (incl HK)  374.4  377.6  463.5  575.4 
Inter-group Distance Index: S8-NIE (excl HK)  504.52  422.31  473.59  597.25 
Inter-group Distance Index: NIE-G7(incl HK)  361.3  313.0  275.9  317.7 
Inter-group Distance Index: NIE-G7(excl HK)  437.34  359.62  273.88  319.72 
Intra-group Distance Index (incl HK)  633.4  522.9  260.5  256.4 
Intra-group Distance Index (excl HK)  725.95  671.09  275.14  140.47 
 1978/83-1996/2001 
Intra-Country Distance Index (incl HK)  1165.54 
Intra-Country Distance Index (excl HK)  710.00 
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Table B2  Indicators for NIEs including and excluding Ireland 
 
 Time  Period 
 1978-83  1984-89  1990-95  1996-2001 
Gini Coefficient  (excl IE)  0.574  0.567  0.641  0.681 
Gini Coefficient (incl IE)  0.543  0.560  0.636  0.677 
Herfindahl Index (excl IE)  0.125  0.109  0.173  0.205 
Herfindahl Index (incl IE)  0.115  0.106  0.163  0.193 
Specialization Index (excl IE)  21.58  19.21  26.85  31.37 
Specialization Index (incl IE)  19.48  18.60  25.93  30.44 
Standard Deviation of RTA (excl IE)  2.288  1.705  0.893  0.738 
Standard Deviation of RTA (incl IE)  1.979 1.486 0.830 0.688 
Chi-square Index (excl IE)  244.35  143.36  68.50  54.50 
Chi-square Index (incl IE)  199.74  117.18  57.51  45.99 
Inter-group Distance Index: S8-NIE (excl IE)  374.4  377.6  463.5  575.4 
Inter-group Distance Index: S8-NIE (incl IE)  312.0 325.0 422.9 518.8 
Inter-group Distance Index: NIE-G7(excl IE)  361.3  313.0  275.9  317.7 
Inter-group Distance Index: NIE-G7(incl IE)  297.4 259.3 238.8 273.2 
Intra-group Distance Index (excl IE)  633.4  522.9  260.5  256.4 
Intra-group Distance Index (incl IE)  523.8 443.1 226.7 257.9 
 1978/83-1996/2001 
Intra-Country Distance Index (excl IE)  1165.54 
Intra-Country Distance Index (incl IE)  980.65   26
Annex C 
 
Table C1  Regression results of specialization indicators against cumulative 
patents 
 
Equation used:  
specialization indicator for period i = α + β ln (cumulative patents at beginning of 
period i) 
 
i  α  β  Adjusted R-squared
CONVERGENCE INDICATORS   
Chi-squared Index    
1978-83  255.84** -31.84*  0.266 
1984-89  257.80** -26.33**  0.368 
1990-95  154.66** -12.58*  0.208 
1996-2001  169.84** -13.32**  0.320 
      
Standard  deviation of RTA    
1978-83 2.657** -0.300**  0.571 
1984-89 3.438** -0.302*  0.220 
1990-95 2.744  -0.183  0.004 
1996-2001  3.104*  -0.215 0.067 
      
CONCENTRATION INDICATORS   
Gini coefficient     
1978-83 0.566**  -0.011  0.045 
1984-89 0.534**  -0.003  -0.045 
1990-95 0.659**  -0.012  0.065 
1996-2001 0.677**  -0.008  -0.006 
      
Herfindahl Index    
1978-83 0.123**  -0.004  0.075 
1984-89 0.099**  0.000  -0.057 
1990-95 0.203** -0.010*  0.165 
1996-2001 0.230**  -0.010  0.081 
      
Specialization Index    
1978-83 21.757** -1.127
† 0.152 
1984-89 17.740**  -0.350  -0.017 
1990-95 30.274** -1.343
† 0.137 
1996-2001 33.165**  -1.159  0.041 
Notes:  
For the period 1978-1983, the number of patents at the end of 1978 has been used as a 
proxy for the cumulative number of patents at the beginning of the period  
N=19.  Countries included in sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US 
**Significant at 0.01 level 
* Significant at 0.05 level 
†  Significant at 0.1 level 
 
Data source: PatentView: U.S. patent information on CD-ROM; Historic Patents By Country, 
State, and Year - Utility Patents, USPTO Web Site, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm   27
Table C2  Regression results of specialization indicators against GDP  
 
Equation used:  
specialization indicator for period i = α + β ln (GDP for first year of period i) 
 
i  α  β  Adjusted R-squared 
CONVERGENCE INDICATORS   
Chi-squared Index    
1978-83 679.42** -52.58*  0.254 
1984-89 531.96** -39.97*  0.281 
1990-95 327.39** -22.12*  0.252 
1996-2001 341.61**  -22.65**  0.395 
      
Standard  deviation of RTA    
1978-83 6.434** -0.477**  0.503 
1984-89 7.771** -0.558*  0.269 
1990-95 6.847
† -0.446  0.082 
1996-2001 7.314*  -0.475*  0.196 
      
CONCENTRATION INDICATORS   
Gini coefficient     
1978-83 0.648**  -0.013  -0.010 
1984-89 0.479**  0.003  -0.055 
1990-95 0.637**  -0.006  -0.045 
1996-2001 0.638**  -0.003  -0.056 
      
Herfindahl Index    
1978-83 0.164**  -0.006  0.030 
1984-89 0.079
† 0.001  -0.048 
1990-95 0.212
† -0.007  -0.010 
1996-2001 0.239
† -0.008  -0.023 
      
Specialization Index    
1978-83  32.56*  -1.501 0.073 
1984-89 15.84
† -0.067  -0.058 
1990-95 30.80
† -0.959  -0.021 
1996-2001 31.43  -0.700  -0.044 
Notes:  
N=19.  Countries included in sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US 
**Significant at 0.01 level 
* Significant at 0.05 level 
†  Significant at 0.1 level 
 
Data source: PatentView: U.S. patent information on CD-ROM; Global Market Information 
Database, Euromonitor 
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